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What colour for the helmet?

Major regional powers and their preferences for UN, regional or ad hoc coalition peace operations

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Abstract


After the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping operations have increasingly been launched by new actors (such as regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions) despite the continued and important role of the United Nations. What do major regional powers prefer? Do they opt for the UN, for 'coalitions of the willing', or for regional organizations when establishing peacekeeping missions? And do they tend to prefer one of the three?

In this paper, I argue that major regional powers tend to deploy their troops with regional organizations or 'coalitions of the willing' when launching peacekeeping operations; I also try to develop possible explanations for this phenomenon.

This research can make a contribution in an almost unexplored field of the literature and it can also tell us more about how core principles of peacekeeping are being modified by the emerging role of new actors.

Key-words

Peacekeeping operations, regional organizations, United Nations



1. Introduction*

Peacekeeping missions have become more complex and more diverse, and the United Nations is no longer the only agent launching peacekeeping operations: regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions have also become lead actors in peacekeeping missions.


In this article, I address the following questions: do states prefer to deploy troops under the auspices of the UN or in other types of mission? How can such preferences be explained? Do any of the trends found help to show that peacekeeping is changing its normative principles?

This work is located in the “international security” sub-field of international relations, and combines quantitative studies focusing on peacekeeping operations with classical work on regionalism and the international law debate.

I seek to make two contributions. First, I offer a conceptualization of the way in which a state's decision to participate in a peacekeeping operation can be assessed, drawing attention to unexplored dimensions. Second, I test major regional powers' preferences for regional peacekeeping through a quantitative analysis, trying to explain their behaviour by looking at three levels of analysis: systemic, regional, and domestic.

At the theoretical level, this work can shed light on the various agents who take part in peacekeeping missions, helping to disentangle the 'black-box' vision of these types of intervention. On the practical level, this work would clear a path towards a check-list of policy recommendations on patterns of contemporary peacekeeping.

I proceed in three steps. First, I conceptualize the notion of peacekeeping operations and develop a model to assess a state's contribution to peacekeeping. Second, I demonstrate the findings of the quantitative analysis, combining it with certain qualitative remarks, and try to explain the trends shown, distinguishing between systemic, regional, and domestic explanations. Third, I draw some final conclusions.




2. What is peacekeeping, and how can states' contributions be measured?

In order to explore states' preferences in peacekeeping operations, the concept of peacekeeping must be clarified and delimited, and states' contributions to peacekeeping must be measured. This section proceeds in two parts. The first part develops a taxonomy of peace operations; the second part elaborates on how states' contributions to peacekeeping may be measured and specifies the cases and time-span involved.

2.1 What is peacekeeping? A working definition

Peace operations are considered by the mainstream literature as military interventions by third states or a group of states meant to keep, build, and maintain peace, with the consent of the host state after the signature of a ceasefire agreement^I. In a more precise sense, peace operations refer to “military and civilian activities led by state, but also non-state^{II} actors in a host state or two (in the case of an inter-state conflict)” (Tardy 2004: 3). Thus, their aim may be to prevent a conflict, to supervise a ceasefire area and stop a deadly conflict, to rebuild a judicial system, or to accompany post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. Their legitimacy may stem from legal consent or coercion (in theory with UNSC authorization) or both (e.g., dubious consent and ex-post authorization). The actors may be a coalition of actors, a single state, or a regional organization.

Here, I refer to peace operations in a broad sense. I use the term “peacemaking” for prevention of conflict, “peacekeeping” for a conflict which is not yet concluded (but after the signature of a cease-fire agreement), and “peace-building” for the aftermath of a conflict. Even if the vision of phases of conflict is too simplistic, these terms are the clearest way of focusing on the type of intervention I am interested in.^{III}




<i>Conflict Phases</i>		<i>Operation</i>	<i>Actors</i>	<i>Use of force</i>	<i>Goals</i>	<i>Conditions of legitimacy</i>
Pre-conflict		Peacemaking	States, Coalitions of the willing, Regional organizations, United Nations	Self-defence	Conflict prevention	UNSC resolution and/or consent of the host state
Conflict	Before cease-fire	Humanitarian Intervention	States, Coalitions of the willing	Limited/ Proportionate	Action taken against the State to stop gross violations of human rights perpetrated inside the State	UNSC resolution and/or consent of the host state
	After cease-fire	Peacekeeping Operation	States, Coalitions of the willing, Regional organizations, United Nations	Limited/ Proportionate use of force	Ceasefire supervision and/or enforcement	UNSC resolution and/or consent of the host state
Post-conflict		Peace building	States, Coalitions of the willing, Regional organizations, United Nations	Self-defence	Reconstruction	UNSC resolution and/or consent of the host state

Table 1: A taxonomy of peace operations and the focus of this research (in bold characters)

Since the resources allocated to peacemaking activities are minor compared to the resources allocated to peacekeeping and peace-building missions, I exclude such activities.^{IV} Whilst fully acknowledging the huge differences between peacekeeping and peace-building, in this paper I consider them together.^V For ease of exposition, I shall use the term “peacekeeping operation” to include peace-building activities, bearing in mind the conceptual differences present. Since the core principles are so different, I exclude humanitarian interventions from the analysis. Based on the distinction between different conflict phases, Table 1 summarizes the different kinds of peace operations, with the operations I consider here put in bold type.

In this article I include only military interventions for peace and humanitarian purposes that have secured permission, ignoring the debate on whether and how such interventions are permissible. That is, I include in the analysis all peacekeeping



operations deployed under the consent of the host state and approved by a UNSC resolution, or, in the case of silence of the UN, by a very broad acceptance by the international community. I take into account peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions deployed from 1956 to the present day.^{VI}

2.2 A multidimensional model for evaluating states' contributions

In order to explore regional powers' preferences for certain types of peacekeeping missions instead of others, it is important, initially, to focus on how these preferences can actually be assessed.

The literature on peacekeeping operations is almost silent on this point. First of all, I define 'preference' by building upon the classical definition in political science: a preference is the best choice given the circumstances.^{VII} A preference is consistent and consequential; it does not deal with the motives and may also mirror a genuine normative orientation. In this work, I do not focus on the motives for deploying, but more on what each state actually prefers in a set of three preferences: UN, regional, or ad hoc peacekeeping.

One strand of the literature on peacekeeping has, from the end of the 1990s onwards, focused on the agents launching peacekeeping operations, such as the UN, regional organizations, and security alliances (Albala-Bertrand, 2000, 21).^{VIII} Interestingly, however, only a few scholars have paid attention to the actors that are the crucial building blocks of these agents, and actually make deployment possible: the nation states. Notwithstanding the very important role played by international civilian bureaucracies, development or emergency agencies and, more recently, by private military companies (the legitimacy of whose participation in such operations is extremely doubtful), nation states remain the core providers of resources and troops.^{IX}

In existing documentation on each country's contribution to peacekeeping, the most commonly used parameter is the number of troops deployed in the field. Both Bellamy and Williams and Daniel and Caraher look at this particular aspect.^X Bellamy and



Williams focus on the qualitative assessment of advantages and disadvantages of regional peacekeeping; Daniel and Caraher investigate the characteristics of the countries which have participated in peace operations between 2001 and 2004. As a matter of fact, assessing each country's contribution to peacekeeping operations in terms of the number of troops is the most intuitive, tangible, and immediate way of assessing the will of a state to contribute to a peace operation. Yet, it is not entirely convincing.^{XI}

Since the existing literature has proved partly inadequate (see footnote 12), I suggest a different model to assess the contribution of nation states to peacekeeping operations. Due to time and space constraints, I use a partial version of this model in this paper. The modest goal is to complement troop counts with other parameters of analysis. It would be appropriate and accurate to use qualitative parameters extensively and not just as complementary remarks, but this will be the task of future research.


The principal parameter therefore remains the contribution of uniformed personnel, assessed through quantitative methods. But other dimensions have emerged from the critique of the literature: funding, technology and training organized by one particular country for the armies of other countries or groups of states. While one may think of many other indicators that could suit the present purposes just as well, I contend that the indicators in question are already sufficiently representative. I argue that these are good proxies, can easily be assessed empirically and are worth being taken into consideration.

Having identified these criteria, I turn now to the States I would like to focus on, the time span of their contributions and the available sources.

2.3 Case selection and time span

Since my claim is that major regional powers prefer non-UN-type of peacekeeping, it is reasonable to choose cases that are described as regional powers.

By regional power I mean a state that plays a clear and uncontested influence in its neighbourhood. In this sense, I build upon the classical understanding of regional hegemony.^{XII} The countries selected may play a role not only in the security sphere but



in the economic one as well. Of course, the role of a regional power can change over time, but for the purposes of the present research this should not be a major problem.

For this reason, I focus on the following States: the United States, for North America; Brazil, for South America; Russia, for Central Asia; China, for East Asia; India, for South Asia; Italy, the UK, Germany and France for Western Europe; Nigeria, for Western Africa; South Africa, for Southern Africa; and Australia, for Oceania. One could wonder why other countries, such as Mexico for Central America or Kenya for Eastern Africa or Japan for East Asia, are not included. The main reason for this is time constraints; but these countries could probably be included during further research. As unanimously recognized by international law, I consider the data about the Soviet Union and Russia in continuity.^{XIII}

The period under consideration lies between the end of the Cold War and 2007. I assume as the starting point of the post-Cold War era the year 1990, and include all available data for 2007.^{XIV}

Concerning the quantitative part of the analysis, I have collected data on each state's contribution of uniformed personnel between 1990 and 2007. I have then distinguished among different missions launched by the United Nations, regional organization and ad hoc coalition missions. Sometimes the missions are launched under the umbrella of a regional organization but are in fact an ad hoc coalition of the willing or a unilateral mission. Since this is not always clear, I have relied upon the label under which the mission is launched.^{XV}

3. The colour of the helmet: findings and explanations

After having developed a model of measurement and having selected the cases, we can now display what the major trends in regional powers' peacekeeping are. First, I show the five findings that emerge from these data. Second, I formulate possible explanations of these results, which show potentially important implications for the future of peacekeeping.



3.1 Findings


The main tendencies and broad findings of the research are described below, with states grouped together by common characteristics. For each group of states, I describe the tendency and double-check with data not strictly related to troop contribution.

1. India, China and Brazil are the only regional powers which always choose the 'blue helmets' (the United Nations peacekeeping missions)
2. None of the major regional powers seems to have completely dismissed the United Nations peacekeeping operations
3. Africa and Western Europe seem to be the areas where peacekeeping missions of regional organizations are formed, even if there is also some experience with ad hoc coalitions
4. The United States, Russia and Australia seem to prefer ad hoc coalitions for peacekeeping
5. Among all the missions a general trend seems to emerge: more and more troops are being deployed in peacekeeping missions, with two recurring peaks: after 1994-1995 and after 2001.

Here I show the results, grouping the countries by their preferences. First, I show the countries choosing UN peacekeeping; second, countries opting for ad hoc coalitions; then, countries deploying preferably within the framework of regional agreements.

Choosing (almost) always the UN: China, India and Brazil

I first focus on the three countries that tend to prefer deploying uniformed personnel within United Nations peacekeeping operations. Among the cases selected, India, Brazil and China are the only regional powers that have never deployed out of a UN framework.



India has deployed its first peacekeepers in 1990 in the UNTAG.^{xvi} After that, an increasing number of peacekeepers have been deployed: from 21 military observers deployed in 1990 to 8821 troops in 2007. More precisely, three peaks in the contribution of uniformed personnel can be singled out: 1994, with India strongly present in Somalia; 2001, with India deployed in the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and in the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE); and 2007, with India's increasing involvement in Lebanon and Sudan. At present, in the ranking of troop contributors to UN peace operations, India is the third largest contributor, after Bangladesh and Pakistan.


Yet, looking only at the number of uniformed personnel deployed does not give a precise understanding of India's role in UN peacekeeping. India plays an important role not only in terms of number of troops but also for its military leadership in UN peacekeeping operations. For instance, since the mission in Sudan has been launched in 2005, the Indian army has been leading the military part of the mission, with Lieutenant General Singh Lidder as Force Commander. Nevertheless, India is not among the top ten financial contributors to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Still, we can consider its role in the contribution of military personnel as increasingly relevant and with an absolutely clear relevance for UN peacekeeping.




India's troop contribution to POs



The Chinese case is also an interesting one to analyze. Two years after the end of the Cold War, the first Chinese peacekeepers were deployed as observers in the United Nations Mission in Iraq and Kuwait (UNIKOM) and in the truce supervision mission in the Suez Channel and Sinai. Since then, China has deployed an increasing number of peacekeepers in numerous contexts, preferring in general traditional peacekeeping operations of truce supervision or monitoring cease-fire agreements between two clearly distinguished parties.




China's troop contribution to POs



Similarly to the case of India, two peaks can be identified on the constantly increasing line of Chinese uniformed personnel deployed. Both peaks are similar to the Indian case: around 1994, with the Somali crisis, China sent many more troops than before (and it sent troops instead of only military observers and logistics); a second noticeable increase comes in 2004, with a stronger involvement in the United Nations Mission in Sudan and in the UN Mission in Liberia.


Whilst Brazil has also provided troops in the framework of regional organizations, such as in Haiti or in the monitoring mission at the border between Ecuador and Peru, nevertheless Brazil's involvement with the United Nations remains largely dominant, particularly with troops deployed with MINUSTAH in Haiti.



Summarizing, among the regional powers India's and China's troop contributions to the UN are the most sizeable. Brazil is the only regional power that clearly still prefers to deploy in UN peacekeeping missions.


Choosing ad hoc coalitions: the US, Russia and Australia

I now move to the group of States who clearly opt for ad hoc coalitions. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has taken part in an increasing number of peacekeeping operations. But, from the 1990s onwards (but in particular after 2001) its preference has been to deploy uniformed personnel within a non-UN framework, in particular to lead ad hoc coalitions. Since the crisis in Somalia, the US has shown a preference for ad hoc interventions. Even in the framework of the United Nations Mission in Somalia, the United States deployed a special US joint operation, UNITAF, outside of the UN, to coordinate the multinational effort in Somalia. After the US withdrawal from Somalia and the tragic Black Hawk Down accident, the US has tended to intervene less with the UN and more within other frameworks. During the Yugoslav



war, the US involvement in UN peacekeeping missions did not disappear but was accompanied by a US presence in NATO peacekeeping operations, such as SFOR or IFOR. This tendency has been strengthened after 9/11. As the table shows, after 2001 a strong increase of ad hoc coalitions can be seen, together with a decrease of UN and regional peacekeeping operations.

United States' Contribution of Military Personnel POs




How can this development be explained? One could argue that this tendency has its explanation at the systemic level, and in the role that the US wants to play in the international arena, deploying outside of Security Council control and deploying quickly when needed. After 9/11, new domestic elements seem to have emerged, such as the strengthening of the neo-conservative wing within the Republican party, legitimizing a more interventionist approach in the context of the war on terrorism, among other aspects. This explanation could account also for the recent preference by the US to deploy in 'coalitions of the willing' instead of within regional organizations. Acting within an ad hoc coalition, the US can deploy more quickly and overcome the need to get the consent of member states, required both within the UN and within regional



organizations. Yet, this explanation cannot account for other dimensions. For example, since the beginning of the 1990s, the US has constantly been the biggest financial contributor to the United Nations (graph 4 shows 2007 data concerning funding).


Providers of assessed contribution to UN Peacekeeping Budget



Building upon this data, the explanation of a constant disengagement of the US from the United Nations is not satisfactory. Therefore, I argue that the US preference for regional or ad hoc coalitions for peacekeeping can be explained as its need for rapid intervention (for humanitarian reasons or strategic priorities), outside of the basic peacekeeping framework. This can lead to a more efficient intervention, but at the same time it could of course lead to a generalized misunderstanding of the founding principles of peacekeeping, such as that to seek the consent of the state where the intervention takes place.



Russia's troop contribution to POs




Russia deployed its first peacekeepers two years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the United Nations mission of truce supervision in Kuwait and Iraq. In 1993, Russian peacekeepers intervened within the framework of the Community of Independent States (CSI) and conducted regional peacekeeping operations in the neighbourhood region of Georgia and Abkhazia. Some literature considers these two operations as having a unilateral character, given the fact that Russia has largely deployed with minimal contributions by other States. Looking at Graph 5, the development of a trade off between ad hoc coalition peacekeeping operations and an emerging preference for regional peacekeeping seems clear. United Nations peacekeeping has been in constant decrease after 1998 but now seems to have levelled off.

International factors seem to be intermittently relevant in accounting for Russia's preferences in peacekeeping. The humanitarian crisis in Somalia did not produce major changes in Russia's choices, but 9/11 has had a greater impact. Regional level instability,




on the contrary, seems pivotal to explain Russia's choices of intervention. It seems reasonable to address the question of why Russia tends to intervene through coalitions of the willing or regional organizations. This may be linked to a Russian interest in managing alone the crises in the former Soviet Republics area. As is the case of the United States, one may ask how this tendency is affecting the core principles of peacekeeping.

Australia clearly shows an increasing preference for deploying in ad hoc coalition peacekeeping, particularly within neighbouring areas. The most important deployment is the intervention in 2003 in the Solomon Islands, in which Australia led a multinational force comprising 1,500 Australian peacekeepers, 300 soldiers from New Zealand and the Pacific Islands (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu) and 400 police officers. This intervention can be seen in the peak of the ad hoc coalition line in the graph.





This tendency can be explained with particular reference to regional level interests. Neither major international events (such as 9/11) nor domestic political turn-overs are able to account for Australia's preference for ad hoc coalition peacekeeping missions.




Going “regional”: Germany, Italy, France, United Kingdom, Nigeria and South Africa


In this paragraph, I demonstrate the findings related to countries that tend to choose regional organizations peacekeeping missions. Despite persisting differences, Germany, France and Italy seem to follow similar patterns, as shown in the following graph.







United Kingdom' troop contribution to POs






Italy's troop contribution to POs






Germany's troop contribution to POs



Three of the four European countries considered, France, the UK and Italy, show a first peak in the deployment of troops between 1993 and 1995. This peak mainly involved UN missions. The peak for all peacekeeping operations was in the mid-nineties, after which both UN peacekeeping and 'coalition of the willing' peacekeeping dropped off. Conversely, regional peacekeeping contributions have continued to remain at very high levels of troop deployment, with a slight increase in 2007. This development is linked to the deployment of an increasing number of regional peacekeepers with NATO interventions in the former Yugoslavia, following which a new regional organization (the European Union) arrives on the scene: in 2003, in Macedonia and then in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the first EU peacekeeping missions were deployed.


Germany's trend is different because, until 1995, Germany deployed only logistic and medical military personnel. After this date, Germany has followed roughly the same trend of the other countries.




Broadly, these four countries seem to choose regional organization missions following the progress of their regional integration. Despite some exceptions, as a whole, regional level explanations seem to prevail.

Nigeria and South Africa show two different trends. On the one hand, Nigeria has, since 2005, deployed an increasing number of peacekeepers within the African Union and ECOWAS frameworks. Since the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia in 1990, Nigeria is the most active among West African states. At the same time, South African troops are increasingly deployed with the UN. Even if it cannot be seen in the graph, South Africa has, throughout the '90s, deployed regional peacekeepers both under the Southern African Development Community (previously SADCC) and under the Organization for the African Union (now African Union) frameworks.

Nigeria's military personnel contribution to peacekeeping operations



**South Africa's military personnel contribution to peacekeeping operations**

3.2 Explanations

These findings show that, with three caveats, major regional powers prefer to deploy in non-UN peacekeeping operations. How can this preference be explained? Explanations are based on the classical three levels of analysis suggested at first by Waltz's "Man, the State and War" and used extensively in International Relations literature. I shall therefore look at international level explanations, regional level explanations and domestic level explanations. These explanations do not aim at providing the necessary conditions for certain choices, but they can give a better insight to understand where peacekeeping is going.



Systemic level explanations

- 1.The major peaks in uniformed personnel contribution tend to shortly follow major tragic events, such as the genocide in Rwanda, the Somali humanitarian crisis, or 9/11.
- 2.The activism of regional organizations and coalitions of the willing increases as a consequence of the stalemates in the United Nations Security Council.

Regional level explanations

- 3.Within the geographic areas with a high level of regional integration, the major regional powers tend to deploy in regional organization peacekeeping missions.
- 4.With one caveat (the European Union), major regional powers choose non-UN missions for interventions in neighbouring areas.

Domestic (and sub domestic) level explanations

- 5.Regime type does not seem to be able to explain the choice of United Nations or non-UN peacekeeping missions. Nigeria, Russia and China are the three non-democratic states among the cases considered, and their preferences are similar to other democratic countries.
- 6.The increasing involvement of certain countries can also be explained by the introduction of new military doctrines and the increasing pressure exercised by sub-state military organizations. For instance, the new Indian army doctrine, called Cold Start, can explain the 2005 peak of the Indian army's involvement.

4. Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that major regional powers tend to prefer deploying in a regional organization or 'coalition of the willing' framework when launching



peacekeeping operations, and have tried to give possible explanations for this phenomenon. As a first step, I clarified what is meant by peacekeeping. Second, I developed a model of how to assess a contribution in peacekeeping operations, mainly looking at the contribution of uniformed personnel, and selected the major regional powers to focus on. Thirdly, I measured States' preferences for various types of peacekeeping. Finally, I developed possible explanations for the results. What are the results emerging from this study?


First of all, it seems clear that there is not a clear trend for preferring a particular type of non-UN kind of peacekeeping. Yet, regional organization's peacekeeping seems to be the first choice within areas where there is a very high level of regional integration, such as the European countries or Nigeria. However, where regional organizations exist but are less strong, there is no common tendency towards UN- or ad hoc coalition missions. On the one hand, China and India deploy in UN peacekeeping operations, preferring, in particular, traditional peacekeeping missions. On the other, states such as the USA, Russia or Australia tend to prefer ad hoc coalition missions. Therefore the 'regional explanation' is good when a regional organization has developed sound security arrangements and when it agrees to deploy peacekeeping missions. In the absence of a strong regional organization, other patterns seem to emerge, involving domestic-level explanations in particular.

Yet, the emergence of a preference for non-UN type of peacekeeping operations, particularly within one's own regional area, can suggest a number of considerations. Why do major regional powers tend to prefer regional deployment or ad hoc coalitions?

First, from this study, it is reasonable to argue that this is linked to the quick timing of such a deployment. Regional powers seem to be willing to deploy in a non-UN context even when they would have the choice of deploying with the UN.

Second, a certain number of regional or ad hoc coalition peacekeeping operations were deployed despite a dubious international consent. I contend that it is easier to circumvent the core principles of peacekeeping by deploying within a regional peacekeeping mission.

Third, certain emerging trends remain to be explained, namely: joint operations between the United Nations and regional organizations, such as the ongoing UNAMID mission in Darfur; and regional-organization missions deployed in the aftermath of a



ceasefire agreement, followed by a United Nations mission, such as in Liberia and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Even if it is rarer, the converse can also happen: this was the case of CEMAC forces deployed in the Central African Republic after the withdrawal of the United Nations troops (MINURCA). Yet, it is still unclear whether these blurred forms are an emerging trend or just isolated events.

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^I They can be UN-led missions, or regional organizations missions or ad hoc coalition missions

^{II} I refer to those missions led by private companies such as the support of International Sanlines to ECOMOG troops in Sierra Leone in 1997 and 1998

^{III} For more on the limits of the vision in phases see Carothers Thomas, "The Sequencing Fallacy", 2007, *Journal of Democracy*, 18(1), pp.12-27

^{IV} Concerning the UN peacemaking activities see <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/budget.html>. All other regional organizations' activities in conflict prevention are even more reduced

^V Apart from the UN terminology, various regional organizations, countries, military organizations and corps within an army refer to peace operations by calling them differently. For example, NATO refers more or less to peace operations as "Peace Support Operations" or "Crisis Response Operations; the EU calls them "conflict prevention and crisis management". The British consider peacekeeping as one of several missions that are subsumed in British Military Doctrine under the heading "Commitments out of the NATO area". U.S. Doctrines identifies peace operations as a subcategory of "low intensity conflicts". Moreover, the conception of peace operations is not homogeneous within the State. Within each country (both the host state and countries that are troops contributors), contrasting images of peace operations emerge from the political arena and the civil society, as well as from the media and non-governmental organizations.

^{VI} The peacekeeping missions before 1956 were observation missions, without the deployment of peacekeepers. This means that I also take into account cases in which there was a problem of consent of the host state but then a UNSC resolution approved *ex post* the mission (such as ECOMOG intervention in Liberia or Sierra Leone). For the same reasons, I exclude the latest US intervention in Iraq.

^{VII} Frieden G. A. "Actors and Preferences in International Relations", in D.A. Lake and R. Powell, (Eds.), 1998, *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, Princeton University Press, 39-76


^{VIII} See for example; K. Allard, 1995, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, Washington, D.C., National Defence University Press, Angelì Andrea, 2005, *Professione peacekeepers, da Sarajevo a Nassiriyah, storie in prima linea*, 2005, Rubbettino editore, Soveria Mannelli; Barnett Michael, "Humanitarianism transformed", 2005, *Perspectives on Politics*, 3(4), pp.723-740, Bellamy Alex and Williams Paul David, "Who's keeping the peace?", 2005, *International Security*, 29, pp. 157-195

^{IX} On this see for example: O'Hanlon Michael and Singer Paul W., 2003 «The Humanitarian Transformation: Expanding Global Intervention Capacity », *Survival*, vol. 46, n.1, pp.77-99

^X Bellamy Alex J. and Williams Paul D. « Who's keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations », 2005, *International Security*, 29, 4, pp. 157-195, D. C. Daniel and Caraher, 2006, « Characteristics of Troop Contribution to Peace Operations and Implications for Global Capacity », *International Peacekeeping*, 13, 3, pp.297-315

^{XI} First, the decision to contribute should not be over-interpreted as a clear-cut indicator of the preference of a country to participate in a particular peace operation. In certain cases, countries' interventions have been the result of contingency. For example, the decision of the US to intervene in Somalia was connected to the US State Department's firm wish not to intervene in Serbia in the same period. Western Jon, 2002, "Sources of Humanitarian Intervention", *International Security*, 26(4), pp.112-142; Second, and more importantly, the weight of troop contribution does not tell us anything about the characteristics of this contribution. For example, are the troops inadequately equipped, perhaps because that particular peacekeeping operation is not a priority amongst other security tasks?

This is particularly true for countries in which sensitivity to casualties is low. For example, Bangladeshi soldiers in Rwanda were inadequately equipped even compared to normal Bangladeshi military provisioning. Dallaire Romeo, 2004 *Shakes Hands with the Devil*, Routledge, London, Thirdly, the number of troops is not the only type of contribution a state can engage in.



Funding, training programs, technology, and logistic support can demonstrate a country's preference for a particular kind of mission. For example, Norway and Sweden offered logistical support to the United Nations- African Union mission in Darfur (UNAMID) where troops deployed are actually from the African Union and not from the two Scandinavian countries. Source : Interview with Willem van Dullemen, Military Office, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations HQ, New York, 10th September 2007. Fourthly, assessment in terms of the number of troops is inadequate for another reason: even if they are, in most cases, the vast majority, troops are not the only way of contributing personnel. Civilian police and military observers can also play an important role, and certain missions may also be civilian police missions, such as the European Union's mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo.

XII Adler Emanuel and Barnett Michael (eds.), 1998, *Security communities*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK

XIII Cassese Antonio, 2004, *Diritto Internazionale. Problemi della Comunità Internazionale*, Il Mulino, Bologna

XIV For example, for troop contributions per country the most recent data are for June 2007

XV Collecting the data has also required some approximations. In every mission, for example, even when mainly troops are deployed, it is common to have a very small number of military observers. Within this kind of missions, I have not distinguished between troops and military observers but I have registered the total number of uniformed personnel in the field, which I deem is a good proxy. Land forces usually are largely dominant but also air and naval forces are often present. I have not distinguished among different kind of military corps but I have considered them as a whole group coming from a particular country. Furthermore, I have included in the analysis both peacekeeping and peace building missions but I have left out of the analysis missions aiming at providing some logistic support. For example, I have not included the DIATM, the logistic mission of the Italian army in Morocco.

XVI UNTAG was the United Nations Transition Assistance Group deployed in Namibia from April 1989 to March 1990.

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
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
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