In Argentina the repercussions on the judicial system deriving from the territorial allocation of power are marked by peculiar features that make this experience not fully ascribable to what can be defined as ‘classic models’ of ‘judicial federalism’, namely the United States and Germany. This is related to the particularities of Latin American constitutionalism in general, and Argentine constitutionalism in particular. For this reason, it is more appropriate to discuss the main features of the federal model established in Argentina first, and then extend the analysis to profiles related to judicial power. In so doing, this essay tries to identify the essential features of judicial federalism in Argentina: i) organization of the judiciary at the two levels; ii) competences of federated entities in defining the status of judges; iii) participation of federated entities in issues related to the ‘self-government of judges’; iv) definition of a coherent system which allows jurisdictional disputes to be resolved. Point iv) is examined with reference to constitutional justice.
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